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Whither the Web?
International Law, Cjbersecurity, and Critical
Infrastructure Protection
David P. Fidler
In November 2014, Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander
of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National
Security Agency (NSA), highlighted how extensively criti-
cal infrastructure protection (CIP) and cybersecurity are
intertwined. In congressional testimony, Rogers observed
that a number of states and non-state actors can shut
down U.S. critical infrastructure through cyber means,
with more nations seeking this capability. "I fully expect
that during my time as the commander," Rogers asserted,
we are going to be tasked to help defend critical infra-
structure within the United States because it is under
attack by some foreign nation or some individual or
group."' "We have got to develop," Rogers argued, "a set of
norms or principles for behaviors in this space." 3
Rogers' call for norms to counter cyber threats to critical
infrastructure challenges the adequacy of existing norms,
including those in international law. This challenge is
serious because where cybersecurity and CIP converge is
not devoid of international law. In fact, a web of norms
based in international law applies to cyber threats to criti-
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cal infrastructure. This web includes
not only legacy rules developed before
cybersecurity and CIP became prom-
inent problems but also interna-
tional law crafted with CIP in mind.
As Rogers' testimony suggests, the
effectiveness of this web of norms is in
doubt, and for good reasons. However,
the desire to create new norms to
address cyber threats to critical infra-
structure confronts serious problems.
The prospects for states agreeing to
new norms are limited. Further, calls
for new norms have to explain how new
principles differ from existing ones
and will escape the ineffective fate of
established rules. These norm-relat-
ed problems help explain why U.S.
policy is showing increasing interest
in developing and exercising cyber
power to deter foreign cyber activi-
ties directed at critical infrastructure.
States should be able to protect its crit-
ical infrastructure from physical and
cyber attacks by 2003.* Subsequently,
critical infrastructure's reliance on the
Internet deepened to the point, as
Admiral Rogers testified, that cyber-
dependent control systems "are foun-
dational to almost every networked
aspect of our life, from our water to
our power to our financial segment to
the aviation industry[.]"'
U.S. experiences underscore why
cybersecurity has become an important
and difficult CIP issue. The Stuxnet
operation against Iran6 and Snowden's
disclosures about NSA capabilities 7
revealed that the United States can
penetrate, monitor, manipulate, and
damage foreign cyber-connected criti-
cal infrastructure. However, the United
States has failed to protect its cyber-
dependent critical infrastructure. 8
[The United States'] disequilibrium between offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities is a dilemma for
critical infrastructure protection around
the world.
Critical Infrastructure's
Cybersecurity Problem and
International Law. Protecting
critical infrastructure gained promi-
nence in the 1990s in response to ter-
rorism and increasing linkages between
critical infrastructure and cyber tech-
nologies. In 1998, President Clinton
established the goal that the United
This disequilibrium between offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities is a
dilemma for CIP around the world.
Although policymakers recognize
CIP should include international
cooperation,9 international law has not
featured prominently in policy dis-
cussions. First, much of a country's
critical infrastructure is located within
its territory (e.g., municipal water sys-
tems), and governments can protect it
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without international law. In addition,
damage to a nation's critical infra-
structure does not always have cross-
border effects, lessening incentives for
governments to worry about CIP in
other countries. The most closely relat-
cyber crime. For cyber threats involv-
ing terrorism, espionage, or armed
conflict, states rely on pre-cyber inter-
national law. Whether this pre-cyber
law applies effectively to cybersecurity
problems is controversial. As analyzed
International law outlaws all but one of the cyber
threats to critical infrastructure that g iVe
policymakers heartburn.
ed international law addresses sectors
considered critical infrastructure, such
as air transport, but this law did not
emerge under the rubric of CIP.o
Second, the Internet's global dis-
semination occurred without states
crafting international law to regulate
this process. The spread of previous
communication technologies prompt-
ed creation of international law and
institutions." The Internet's differ-
ent history became clear in contro-
versies over Internet governance, with
defenders of the multi-stakeholder
model, which operates without need-
ing or generating international law,
battling advocates of bringing Internet
governance within formal interna-
tional law and organizations." When
the Internet- critical infrastructure
relationship deepened, there was no
Internet- specific international law
on which to graft CIP objectives.
Third, cybersecurity's emergence as
a policy concern has not generated
much international law. States have
adopted specific international law for
[io] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
below, these legacy rules are impor-
tant for international law's role in
protecting critical infrastructure
from cyber threats, but these rules
were not developed to strengthen CIP.
The lack of international law for
CIP, Internet governance, and cyber-
security might suggest norms are miss-
ing concerning cyber threats to critical
infrastructure. However, international
law is not a normative vacuum for CIP.
Indeed, international law outlaws all
but one of the cyber threats to critical
infrastructure that give policymakers
heartburn. In addition, states are start-
ing to use international law to improve
cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-
ture. To borrow Admiral Rogers' lan-
guage, international law contains a "set
of norms or principles for behaviors
in this space." However, anxiety about
cyber threats to critical infrastructure
reveals a lack of confidence in this inter-
national law. Understanding this prob-
lem requires probing existing inter-
national law, exploring how states are
adapting such law to the CIP challenge,
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and analyzing calls for new norms.
Legacy Rules and Cyber
Crime Treaties: Existing
International Law and
Cyber Threats to Critical
Infrastructure. Cyber threats to
critical infrastructure arise from crim-
inals, terrorists, and the intelligence
agencies and militaries of states. With
one exception, international law makes
cyber activities by state or non-state
actors that undermine CIP illegal.
Most of the relevant norms come from
pre-cyber international law, which
are applied to cybersecurity problems.
Many constitute fundamental prin-
ciples, including the prohibitions on
intervention, use of force, and attacks
on civilian targets in armed conflict.
The exception is espionage because
international law does not prohibit or
regulate it.
International Law, Critical
Infrastructure Protection,
and Cyber Threats from Non-
State Actors. States have developed
international law for cyber crime. The
leading treaty, the Council of Europe's
Convention on Cybercrime (COE
Convention), harmonizes national
laws and facilitates law enforcement
cooperation on cyber crimes.'3 The
African Union's Convention on Cyber
Security and Personal Data Protection
(AU Convention) includes the same
objectives." Although these treaties do
not include crimes specific to criti-
cal infrastructure, their offenses apply
to using unauthorized access to com-
puters operating critical infrastructure
to steal information, disrupt opera-
tions, extort money, or cause dam-
age. In cases involving states not party
to cyber crime treaties, governments
can use general-purpose extradition
agreements and mutual legal assistance
treaties (MLATs) to address cyber
crime involving critical infrastructure.
Terrorist efforts to access, dis-
rupt, or damage computers operat-
ing critical infrastructure would fall
within the international law on cyber
crime. In addition, the International
Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist
Bombings Convention),'5 which
168 countries have ratified, 6 can be
interpreted to cover terrorist cyber
attacks against critical infrastructure.
It requires parties to criminalize acts
undertaken with the intent to cause
death, serious bodily injury, or exten-
sive property destruction to an "infra-
structure facility" 7 through a weapon
or device "designed, or has the capabil-
ity, to cause death, serious bodily inju-
ry or substantial material damage." 8
These provisions can encompass mali-
cious software targeting critical infra-
structure. States adopted this treaty in
1997 when concerns about terrorism
against critical infrastructure became
prominent, including worries about
cyber vulnerabilities. In short, inter-
national law contains a widely accepted
norm against terrorism perpetrated
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against critical infrastructure through
various means, including cyber.
Cyber Threats to Critical
Infrastructure from Military
and Intelligence Activities.
National security officials worry that
foreign governments pose cyber threats
to critical infrastructure. RecallAdmiral
Rogers' prediction that, during his time
in office, U.S. Cyber Command and
NSA will have to respond to a serious
cyber attack on U.S. critical infrastruc-
ture, potentially launched by a foreign
country. In this context, international
law has many norms, whether such an
attack occurs in peace or war. During
peacetime, international law prohib-
its the use of force by states," and the
attack Rogers fears might violate this
rule. Even if the attack did not con-
stitute an illegal use of force, it would
violate the obligations to settle disputes
peacefully and not to intervene in the
domestic affairs of another state.2 o To
avoid violating these norms, the foreign
country would need to justify its cyber
attack, perhaps arguing that it was using
force in self-defense in response to an
armed attack by the United States."
During armed conflict, the laws of
war would apply to cyber attacks on crit-
ical infrastructure. Depending on the
circumstances, a cyber attack on civil-
ian critical infrastructure could violate
the prohibitions on attacking civil-
ian targets, using indiscriminate means
and methods of attack, and engaging
in attacks that cause disproportionate
civilian damage. These rules would not
apply if the critical infrastructure was a
legitimate military target (e.g., a "dual-
use" target) or the cyber operations did
not constitute "attacks" under the law
of armed conflict, namely acts intend-
ed, or reasonably like to cause, inju-
ry, death, damage, or destruction.
In his testimony, Admiral Rogers
expressed concern that foreign govern-
ments are conducting cyber reconnais-
sance on U.S. critical infrastructure. 3
However, international law does not
prohibit foreign governments from
spying on U.S. critical infrastructure.
This situation is not unusual because,
as noted above, international law does
not seriously regulate espionage.'
Intelligence agencies have exploit-
ed every new communications tech-
nology, and cyber technologies have
been no different. U.S. complaints
about Chinese cyber espionage have
not gained international legal trac-
tion, even before Snowden revealed
U.S. cyber espionage capabilities.
International law's permissiveness does
not mean spying is harmless. It can
create significant costs, disrupt nation-
al security strategies, and destabilize
relations between nations. However,
states have been unwilling to con-
trol espionage through international
law-an outlook cyber threats to criti-
cal infrastructure have not changed.
A Cyber-Defense Norm:
International Law and
Strengthening Cybersecurity
[12] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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in Critical Infrastructure.The
web of norms also involves states using
international legal mechanisms and
instruments to strengthen cybersecu-
rity within critical infrastructure in two
ways. First, states work to strengthen
CIP against cyber threats within exist-
ing international legal frameworks.
These efforts, by and large, do not
produce new international law but use
established processes to achieve better
cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-
ture. Second, countries create interna-
tional legal obligations to protect criti-
cal infrastructure from cyber threats.
These practices reveal emergence of an
international norm on strengthening
cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-
ture.
The practices also reveal a differ-
ent approach to CIP. The legacy rules
and international law on cyber crime
discussed above slot a cyber threat into
a category (e.g., terrorism, armed
conflict) in order to identify what
rules apply. By contrast, the approach
informing the cyber-defense norm is
an "all hazards" strategy to protect
critical infrastructure from the range
of cyber threats. This strategy does
not focus on whether a cyber intru-
sion constitutes crime or espionage,
but whether networks are protected
against infiltrations from any source.
Strengthening Critical
Infrastructure's Cyber
Defenses Through Existing
Cooperative Mechanisms. As
cyber threats to CIP became more
important, states started to use exist-
ing multilateral, regional, and bilat-
eral mechanisms to cooperate on this
problem. These efforts typically have
not produced new international law
but have elevated cybersecurity threats
to critical infrastructure in established
processes and institutions. For exam-
ple, the UN's governmental group of
experts analyzing international security
implications of information technolo-
gies identified the need for increased
cooperation on cyber threats to criti-
cal infrastructure." ASEAN,2 6 EU,2 7
OAS, 8 OECD, 9 NATO, 3 o and U.S.-
Canada cooperation3 ' have undertak-
en activities on this issue. Generally,
these efforts seek to strengthen cyber
defenses for critical infrastructure,
improve information sharing on
threats and cybersecurity practices, and
facilitate assistance to other countries.
International organizations oversee-
ing critical infrastructure sectors are
also addressing cybersecurity. The
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)32 and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO)3 3 are
increasing their members' awareness
of, and efforts to protect against, cyber
threats to nuclear energy and civil avia-
tion.
The IAEA's and ICAO's efforts pro-
vide a model for other international
organizations or regimes responsible
for critical infrastructure sectors to
increase CIP activities against cyber
threats. To the extent not already
underway, activities within other legal
International Engagement on Cyber V [131
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frameworks touching on critical infra-
structure, such as treaties on manag-
ing shared watercourses or control of
industrial accidents, can implement
the "soft law" norm of strengthen-
ing cyber defenses for critical infra-
structure, thus implementing it more
widely where cyber-dependent critical
infrastructure control systems operate.
Strengthening Critical
Infrastructure's Cyber
Defenses Through New
International Law. Some states
have gone beyond cooperation through
established mechanisms to adopt inter-
national legal obligations specific to
protecting critical infrastructure from
cyber threats. An EU directive requires
EU members to designate "European
Critical Infrastructure" in the energy
and transport sectors and mandate that
operators have security plans cover-
ing risks, including cyber threats.3 '
Members of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) agreed in a treaty
to cooperate on ensuring informa-
tion security within critical infrastruc-
tures. 3 The AU Convention requires
parties to take cybersecurity actions to
protect critical infrastructure. 3 The
use of binding requirements distin-
guishes this part of the web of norms
from non-binding activities under-
taken within existing legal frameworks.
States could craft more specific inter-
national law to bolster cyber defenses
for critical infrastructure in a number
of ways. Governments could negotiate
a "Convention for the Suppression of
[14] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Acts of Cyber Terrorism" that, among
other things, addresses the threat of
terrorist cyber activities against criti-
cal infrastructure. Following the AU
Convention, parties to the COE
Convention could amend the trea-
ty to require additional sanctions
for cyber crimes committed against
critical infrastructure. Reflecting on
the Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare, governments
and non-governmental experts could
collaborate in clarifying how inter-
national law applies to cyber opera-
tions against critical infrastructure in
armed conflict and cyber threats against
critical infrastructure in peacetime.3 7
Problems with the Web of
Norms.
Problems with legacy rules and cyber- crime treaties:
Although pre-cyber norms apply, many
did not function well before cyberse-
curity came along. The effectiveness of
the prohibitions on intervention in the
domestic affairs of other states and on
the use of force has long been contro-
versial. Adding cyber to the mix has not
produced stability. For example, wheth-
er various cyber operations, including
Stuxnet, violated the use-of-force pro-
hibition has been debated without con-
sensus arising. The possibilities cyber
technologies offer intelligence agen-
cies and militaries increase incentives
to keep certain legal waters muddied,
raising concerns about the effectiveness
of legacy rules in the cyber age.
In terms of espionage and armed
conflict, the legacy rules apply in
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ways that make use of cyber technolo-
gies attractive. The Internet has been
"God's gift to spies,"38 and, despite the
problems associated with cyber espio-
nage, states generally have no appe-
tite to restrict this practice through
international law. The United States
favors an international norm against
economic espionage,3 ' but it has not
been successful in advancing it-and
Snowden's disclosures have made this
objective harder. The law of armed
conflict applies in ways that make cyber
gal cyber acts to specific actors often
proves technically difficult, a prob-
lem compounded by legal principles
for determining state responsibility or
imposing criminal sanctions on indi-
viduals that set high evidentiary thresh-
olds. Thus, the attribution prob-
lem often weakens the effectiveness
of legacy rules and treaties on cyber
crime when applied to protect critical
infrastructure from cyber threats.
Finally, in terms of cyber-crime
threats to critical infrastructure, exist-
The possibilities cyber technologies offer intelligence
agencies and militaries increase incentives to keep
certain legal waters muddied, raising concerns
about the effectiveness of legacy rules in
the cyber age.
weapons, operations, and attacks attrac-
tive politically, militarily, and ethically.
Being able to disrupt critical infra-
structure deemed a "dual use" target
with cyber means, rather than destroy-
ing it with kinetic violence, offers capa-
bilities advanced militaries want. So,
rather than discouraging interest in
cyber, the laws of war heighten it.4 o
Many legacy rules and the law in
cyber-crime treaties also struggle with
the attribution problem. For exam-
ple, to apply the prohibition on the
use of force or criminal offenses in
anti-terrorism and cyber-crime trea-
ties, the rules require identification
of the perpetrator. Attributing ille-
ing treaties are not, to date, widely
accepted. Only 46 countries have rati-
fied the COE Convention, despite the
treaty being open for any state to join for
over a decade. 4" The AU Convention,
adopted in June 2014, has not entered
into force, and only AU members can
ratify it. These facts mean many states
rely on extradition treaties and MLATs
to address cyber crime against critical
infrastructure, but these instruments
have not proved sufficiently effective
against cyber crime for many reasons,
including the attribution problem."
Problemswiththe "allhazards"cyber- defense norm:
Using international law to strengthen
International Engagement on Cyber V [I]
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cyber defenses in critical infrastruc-
ture is not politically controversial, and
the "all hazards" approach avoids the
attribution problem. However, wheth-
er using existing international legal
mechanisms or creating new interna-
tional law can significantly improve
cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-
ture is a harder question. Non-binding
activities in various international orga-
nizations, such as IAFA and ICAO,
are too recent and uneven to invite
either enthusiasm or cynicism. In
terms of new international law, the
AU Convention has no track record
because it is not in force. Whether the
SCO treaty has contributed to better
cybersecurity in critical infrastructure
of SCO members is not apparent.
The EU observed that, while opin-
ions differed on whether cybersecurity
had improved, its directive "encour-
aged policies for the protection of
national critical infrastructure . . .
[and] resulted in concrete actions such
as the creation of specific national
bodies to deal with CIP policies."' 3
More substantively, whether the
cyber-defense norm contributes
enough to protecting critical infra-
structure from cyber threats, especially
"advanced persistent threats" from states
or criminal organizations, is not clear.
Concerns about cyber-defense mea-
sures have fed debates about the need
for "active defense" strategies, which
include, among other approaches, vic-
tims "hacking back" against suspect-
ed perpetrators.44 The controversies
surrounding active defense mean that
[16] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
no active-defense norm is likely-but
skepticism about cyber defenses is not
dissipating, as will be addressed below.
Problems with calls for new norms:
Admiral Rogers is not alone in want-
ing new norms. For years, the Obama
administration emphasized the need
for "norms of responsible behavior in
cyberspace,"' and, in 2015, the U.S.
government has advanced principles
it believes "can contribute substan-
tially to conflict prevention and stabil-
ity in time of peace."46 U.S. technol-
ogy companies, such as Microsoft, have
developed ideas for norms. 7 However,
these calls for new norms confront the
damage Snowden did to the United
States in international cyber affairs.
For example, U.S. arguments that
cyber espionage targeting the private
sector (including operators of critical
infrastructure) constitutes economic
warfare" *8 have been, in the post-
Snowden period, dead on arrival inter-
nationally. Another problem with
the desire for new norms is a lack of
clarity about what norms people have
in mind and how they differ from
what the existing web of norms con-
tains. For example, the U.S.-proposed
norms prohibiting a state from damag-
ing or interfering with critical infra-
structure or computer emergency
response capabilities in another state
apply to actions that are illegal under
international law.49 Pushing for cyber-
specific corollaries to existing rules is
not objectionable, but the upside is
limited given that international law
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already outlaws the behavior in ques-
tion. However, some corollaries might
re-open controversies in internation-
al law. For example, trying to shield
national computer emergency response
capabilities from cyber operations
during armed conflict might highlight
disagreements about "dual use" tar-
gets, including friction related to posi-
tions of countries, such as the United
States, that define such targets broadly.
Finally, proposals for new norms
have to explain how they would fare
better than the old ones. Advocacy for
cyber-specific corollaries to existing
general principles often fails to illu-
minate why state or non-state actor
compliance would improve. Admiral
Rogers expressed his concern that a
foreign country or non-state group
will, in the near future, launch a major
cyber attack on U.S. critical infra-
structure-an attack that would violate
international law. Why Rogers thinks
that foreign countries or non-state
groups-apparently willing to defy
international law-would comply with,
or be deterred by, new norms is per-
plexing. The answer to this riddle might
be that norms are not, in fact, the
answer to the problem Rogers posited.
From Norms to Power: The
Dawn of Cyber Deterrence.
In congressional testimony in March
2015, Admiral Rogers focused on the
need for the United States to develop,
threaten, and use offensive cyber capa-
bilities to deter foreign cyber threats.5 0
Rogers argued that strategies focused
on cyber defenses are not protecting
U.S. computer networks or deterring
foreign state and non-state actors from
infiltrating them. According to Rogers,
the answer is to use offensive cyber capa-
bilities to increase deterrence. In early
April 2Q15, President Obama signed
an executive order authorizing sanc-
tions on individuals outside the United
States who engage in malicious cyber
activities that constitute a threat to U.S.
national security, foreign policy, eco-
nomic health, or financial stability."
The executive order included within
such threats cyber activities that harm
or compromise entities operating criti-
cal infrastructure. The executive order
seeks to deter individuals, by threat of
targeted sanctions, from engaging in
malicious cyber activities against U.S.
computer networks, especially those
used to operate critical infrastruc-
ture.52 In mid-April 2oi5, the U.S.
Department of Defense released its new
cyber strategy, 3 and news reports and
experts noted the strategy's emphasis on
offensive capabilities and deterrence.5 '
These developments reflect height-
ened emphasis by the U.S. government
on deterrence achieved through offen-
sive cyber capabilities and operations
or financial and travel sanctions against
perpetrators. This shift is not incom-
patible with an interest in norms, but
it reflects less confidence that existing
or new norms will, for the foreseeable
future, improve cybersecurity for criti-
cal infrastructure. Instead, the United
States wants to deter cyber threats to
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Heightened emphasis by the U.S.
government on deterrence ... reflcts less confi-
dence that existing or new norms will, for the foresee-
able future, improve cybersecurity for critical
infrastructure.
critical infrastructure by exercising
material power to threaten and, if nec-
essary, impose punishment. As Admiral
Rogers acknowledged, cyber deterrence
will not be like previous experienc-
es with deterrence, especially in the
nuclear context."5 What cyber deter-
rence means, and how it affects the web
of norms relevant to protecting criti-
cal infrastructure, is about to unfold.
[i8] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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